In Defence of Particularism: A Reply to Stokes by Dentith, Matthew R. X.
 
http://social-epistemology.com 
ISSN: 2471-9560  
 
In Defence of Particularism: A Reply to Stokes 
 
Matthew R. X. Dentith, ICUB, University of Bucharest 
 
–––––––––––––––––– 
 
Denith, Matthew R.X. “In Defence of Particularism: A Reply to Stokes.” Social Epistemology 
Review and Reply Collective 5, no. 11 (2016): 27-33. 
 
http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3jU  
  
 27 
Vol. 5, no. 11 (2016): 27-33  
http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3jU 
There has been a flurry of talk of conspiracy theories in these pages recently, largely led by 
Lee Basham and myself engaging in friendly correspondence over my paper ‘When inferring 
to a conspiracy theory might be the best explanation.’ 1 , 2 , 3  Patrick Stokes, another 
philosopher interested in the philosophy of conspiracy theories, has gently criticised both 
Basham and myself for our portrayal of the tension between generalist takes on belief in 
conspiracy theories—which portray belief in conspiracy theories as typically irrational—and 
our particularist agenda, which requires that we assess conspiracy theories on the particulars 
of their evidence, rather than just dismiss them because they are called ‘conspiracy theories’. 
 
Stokes’ criticism is not a defence of generalism per se. Rather, he takes it that Basham and I 
are over-egging the pot, so to speak, and not admitting that some part of the generalist 
agenda is worth hanging on to. Stokes proposes some kind of middle ground, or third way: 
in his own words, ‘defeasible generalism’ or ‘reluctant particularism.’4 I am sympathetic to 
Stokes’ overall point: more nuance in how we talk about conspiracy theories in public 
discourse, and the epistemic and psychological factors at the root of why people hang views 
on certain recurrent conspiracy narratives can only be of benefit to the academic literature at 
large. Yet despite this, I find myself troubled by some of the details and arguments Stokes 
uses to motivate this. 
 
The Alleged Problem of Particularism 
 
Stokes gently chastises us for downplaying worries about the cultural and social practices 
associated with allegations of conspiracy. As Stokes’ puts it: 
 
[T]here is ... [a] risk of allowing a legitimate target of critique to hide within 
an innocent larger category of “conspiracy explanation.” That target is 
conspiracy theorizing as a recognizable concrete social practice and tradition. 
When people dismiss something as a “conspiracy theory” they don’t do so in 
a vacuum. Nor are they necessarily referring to a specific and precisely 
defined epistemological category.5 
 
Indeed, Stokes argues there is a very real danger here, in that the particularist—in their 
defence of the epistemology of conspiracy theorising—ignores or downplays the ‘morally 
serious act of accusation’.6 As supporting evidence of this, he discusses the case of James 
Tracy, a former Professor of Communications at Florida Atlantic University, whose tenure 
was recently terminated. 7 Stokes is right to point out that Tracy was not fired for conspiracy 
                                                
1 Basham, “The Need for Accountable Witnesses.” 
2 Dentith, “When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation.” 
3 Dentith, “Treating Conspiracy Theories Seriously.” 
4 Stokes, “Between Generalism and Particularism About Conspiracy Theory,” 38. 
5 Ibid., 35. 
6 Ibid., 37. 
7 I should like to state that I know Jim, have had drinks with Jim, and have interviewed (and 
been interviewed by) Jim for our respective podcasts. 
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theorising per se. Rather, he was fired on the grounds that he was taken to be harassing the 
father of one of the victims of the Sandy Hook Massacre, making accusations that said 
father was crying wolf about his son’s death (and, indeed, existence). 
 
Now, there is nothing inherently wrong about theorising that mass shooting events in the 
US might be part of a plot, say, by the federal government to curb gun rights. That is a 
perfectly interesting question. Indeed, I would argue, entertaining that notion is something 
someone, somewhere should engage in.8 The move to accusation, though—Stokes’ worry—
seems like something we should have a threshold for. It is one thing to ponder the 
epistemics of conspiracy. It is another to engage in the morally serious act of making 
accusations. Yet I worry that he is conflating two separate issues because Stokes goes on to 
characterise conspiracy theorising as: 
 
[A] practice that involves beliefs that are largely impervious to rational 
refutation, that characteristically encourages participants to level an 
expanding range of un-evidenced accusations, that is inimical to and 
corrosive of foundational trust, and that in some cases license behaviors 
(even among college professors) such as harassing and defaming grieving 
parents. One might reasonably be concerned about such a practice.9 
 
Is this social and cultural practice really conspiracy theorising, though, or is it the hooking of 
certain views on to conspiracy narratives? 
 
Conspiracy Narratives 
 
Talk of conspiracy narratives—the complex social and psychological factors which seem to 
underpin elements of certain recurrent claims of conspiracy—is an interesting field with a 
long history. Indeed, Richard Hofstadter’s seminal piece, ‘The paranoid style in American 
politics’ is, arguably, less about conspiracy theories as it is about the conspiracy narratives 
employed in US politics.10 Certainly, that was the tenor of Gordon S. Wood’s criticism of 
Hofstadter, in which he examines talk of conspiracy in 18th and 19th Century North 
America in order to show Hofstadter’s claims about the exceptionalism of 20th Century US 
politics has a much longer history. 11  Geoffrey Cubitt looks at the role stories about 
perfidious Jesuits played in France at about the same time,12 a topic Thomas Kaiser, et al. 
also examine.13 Victoria Emma Pagán looks back to Ancient Rome, and the way in which 
certain tropes reoccur in talk of conspiracy in Roman literature.14 15 Joseph Roisman provides 
                                                
8 I imagine someone in a room, dispassionately coming up with conspiracy theories, and 
then getting her lackeys to see if they have any merit. 
9 Stokes, “Between Generalism and Particularism About Conspiracy Theory,” 38 
10 Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays. 
11 Wood, “Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style.” 
12 Cubitt, The Jesuit Myth. 
13 Kaiser, Linton, and Campbell, Conspiracy in the French Revolution. 
14 Pagán, Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History. 
15 Pagán, Conspiracy Theory in Latin Literature. 
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a similar analysis for such talk in Ancient Athens.16 Conspiracy narratives are cases where 
alleged conspiracies by the usual suspects—women, slaves, Jews, Catholics, and the like—are 
used as convenient scapegoats. These narratives are arational, in that they are rhetorical bad 
habits (‘Somethings wrong in your neighbourhood. Who you gonna blame? Feminists!’), 
which are not epistemically constrained, nor are they deployed on the basis of evidence. 
Now, whilst I do not agree with some of the conclusions these authors draw from their 
historical analyses of such narratives, it is intriguing to see how certain conspiratorial tropes 
reoccur in particular societal settings. It is, then, unfortunate, that Stokes’ chooses to cites—
one assumes approvingly—the work of Jovan Byford. 
 
Byford is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the Open University. In his 2011 book, 
‘Conspiracy theories: a critical introduction’, he writes: 
 
Chapter 2 sets the scene for the subsequent discussion by looking at how 
legitimate analyses of secrecy and collusion in politics might be differentiated from conspiracy 
theories. It looks at why it is important (although not always easy) to maintain 
the distinction between the two types of explanation.17 
 
Why does Byford need to distinguish between ‘legitimate analyses of secrecy’ and conspiracy 
theories? Because he’s a generalist. Throughout his book Byford talks about conspiracy 
theories as being merely rhetorical devices,18 claims conspiracy theories as we know them 
have their origin in the French Revolution19 (a claim so ahistorical it is hard to treat seriously, 
especially given the work of the aforementioned historians), are anti-Semitic in character 
(even if they do not immediately appear to be so), 20  and that we should resist taking 
conspiracy theories seriously, or even recognising them as a view of the world worth 
listening to.21 
 
Byford is a generalist, pure and simple, and he develops an analysis of this thing called 
‘conspiracy theorising’ in order to show that, generally, it produces bad theories. As a 
consequence, we do not need to engage with these theories on the evidence. 
 
It’s useful, then, to compare Byford with Lance deHaven-Smith, who also thinks we should 
distinguish between conspiracy theories and legitimate analyses of secrecy. deHaven-Smith is 
a proponent of a very particular set of 9/11 conspiracy theories, the Inside Job hypotheses 
(which claim the events of 9/11 were orchestrated by elements within the US, likely the 
government). deHaven-Smith recognises his beliefs are usually labelled pejoratively as 
‘conspiracy theories’, and thus thinks that we should avoid using the label. Instead, he wants 
us to focus our attention on what he calls ‘state crimes against democracy’, or SCADS.22 
                                                
16 Roisman, The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens. 
17 Byford, Conspiracy Theories, 18. 
18 Ibid., ch. 2. 
19 Ibid., ch. 3. 
20 Ibid., ch. 6. 
21 Ibid., ch. 7. 
22 deHaven-Smith, Conspiracy Theory in America. 
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Byford and deHaven-Smith are keen to rob conspiracy theory of its potency by appealing to 
their intuition that something about conspiracy theorising is considered fishy by most 
people. Byford wants us to embrace our scepticism of conspiracy theories by showing that 
conspiracy theorising is a problem. deHaven-Smith wants to rescue the central concerns of 
the conspiracy theorist by simply giving what she does a new and untarnished name. Yet 
both of these moves are problematic. Byford overstates his case, largely by assuming 
conspiracy theories are bad, and then engaging in post facto reasoning to justify his conclusion. 
deHaven-Smith simply renames his problem. ‘Sure,’ he might well be saying, ‘No one trusts 
homeopathy, but my new homeopathy* won’t suffer the same kind of criticisms!’ 
 
Both of these conspiracy theory theorists are invoking the spectre of a kind of conspiracy 
narrative infecting decent talk about when we might think some dastardly secret plot is 
occurring. That is to say, they are worried about conspiracy narratives rather than conspiracy 
theorising. 
 
The same criticisms cannot be levelled at the historians. Whether or not we accept their folk-
psychological or folk-sociological views about the general warrant of the theories they focus 
on, they—at the very least—situate their worries about conspiracy narratives into the 
specific milieu of the cultures and periods they study. Byford, unfortunately, is just a bad 
example for Stokes. 
 
None of this is to say that Stokes’ overall point should be dismissed. We will get to the 
merits of his contribution in the next section. Rather, I am keen to point out that the idea 
that we can fruitfully analyse conspiracy theories as a general mode of explanation—as 
Byford does—and thus come to a nuanced, rather than what Stokes’ calls a ‘naive’ 
particularism often just ends up simply rehashing or relabelling the very problematic views 
particularists have been fighting against since Charles Pigden started work on this 
epistemological project back in 1995.23 
 
In Defence of Conspiracy Theorising 
 
This brings us back to Tracy. His accusation that a certain son never existed—and thus 
never died—at Sandy Hook is based upon his conviction that the Sandy Hook mass 
shooting event was a hoax. However, in the final accounting, Tracy’s terminal error was to 
insist someone provide a birth certificate for their son, to prove that said son had ever 
existed. Tracy made a serious accusation, which said father took to be harassment. This is 
what his employer, the university, took a dim view of.24 However, we must note that you can 
theorise about conspiracy theories without making accusations. Tracy could have (and, indeed, 
did for a time) theorise about mass shooting events being false flag events without making 
                                                
23 Pigden, “Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories.” 
24 Like Stokes, I also am not making any claim here about the appropriateness of the university’s response to 
the claim of harassment. However, I take it to be obvious that Tracy’s claim is a serious one, and that there are 
moral costs to making such a accusation. 
  
 31 
Vol. 5, no. 11 (2016): 27-33  
http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-3jU 
explicit accusations. 25  Even then, in the case where the conspiracy theorist makes an 
accusation, it is not necessarily the case that they will make ever expanding accusations. 
 
Stokes would be better off pressing his point against conspiracy narratives. The way in which 
certain conspiracy narratives repeat tropes and forms, after all, is a recognised problem, and 
it is certainly the case that we see the same accusations—mutatis mutandis—occur over and 
over again with respect for them. For example, the long history of recurrent anti-Semitic 
conspiracy narratives—which were given voice once again in the last week of Donald J. 
Trump’s presidential campaign—shows some claims of conspiracy will refuse to die 
regardless of how much evidence that we might lay against them. Narratives like these, 
despite a mass of evidence weighed against them over time, unfortunately continue to 
reappear.26 
 
However, if Stokes wants to push the point more generally, and bring in conspiracy 
theorising, then he will end up misrepresenting things. We can understand the reticence to 
engage in the accusation of conspiracy without having to drag conspiracy theorising into things. 
Conspiracy theorising does not require ever expanding accusations. The problem, rather, 
Stokes is tilting against is people being inappropriately defensive about their conspiracy 
narratives when evidence is levelled against them. This gets us to the crux of this friendly 
disagreement with Stokes. ‘Conspiracy theorising’ is being used ambiguously here. It can, as 
he notes, refer to a form of narrative, or mode of explanation. Or it can refer to the activity 
of coming up with a particular conspiracy theory. 
 
We must resist trading on this ambiguity. To theorise about a conspiracy—to wit, to engage 
in conspiracy theorising—is a different task from hooking into an existing conspiracy 
narrative to press a point. In the works of the aforementioned historians, we see examples of 
general worries in a population being expressed as conspiracy narratives. The claim of 
conspiracy does not come out of genuinely asking ‘Who or what is behind this?’ Rather, 
some problem is blamed upon a pre-existing conspiracy narrative, one which blames the 
usual suspects. Now, some will claim that all I am doing here in response to Stokes is to 
engage in a language game, just like Byford and deHaven-Smith. ‘Oh, we’re not talking about 
that kind of conspiracy theorising when we defend particularism...’ Yet I would argue that by 
clearly speciating out talk of conspiracy theories with respect to conspiracy theorising and 
the invocation of conspiracy narratives is principled case of the particularist insisting that we 
need to work with the evidence. After all, if the evidence is ‘This looks like a redressed 
version of a Jewish banking conspiracy narrative’, then the appropriate evidential response is 
                                                
25 I take it here that the threshold for accusation here something higher than simply saying ‘They are up to 
something...’ After all, some low level accusation will be inherent to any claim of conspiracy, and we surely 
want to be able to entertain claims about conspiracies in order to investigate them. 
26  It’s useful here to note that the earliest found mention of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ refers to a 
‘recrudescence of the conspiracy theory’ (“conspiracy, n.” 2011), which suggests that even in 1909, people were 
aware that said theories sometimes ape earlier narratives. 
 
 
 
 
 
M.R.X. Dentith 
 
 
 32 
to ask ‘Hasn’t this been debunked?’ Because if it has, then we will have evidence to mount 
against the new version. If it has not, then we need to investigate the claim further.27 
 
That being said, Stokes is right that there is a certain naiveté to any particularist response 
which handwavingly says evidence will win out. Human beings, unfortunately, do not weigh 
up claims dispassionately. Maybe we particularists are too inclined to think rational inquiry 
will save the day, or perhaps we think of such enquiry taking years or even decades. Maybe 
some of us just downplay certain reoffenders by saying ‘No one takes those theories 
seriously!’ But note that this is not a fault with particularism. Rather, it’s a fault of particular 
particularists. Some of us have been hasty in our defence of particularism, but our haste is 
not a mark against the thesis. It is, instead, a mark against the way in which we have 
propounded our views, and we should thank Stokes for reminding us to not repeat the 
errors of the generalist. 
 
Contact details: m.dentith@episto.org 
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